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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on the Choice of Court 
Agreements sets forth uniform international rules for the 
enforcement of “exclusive choice of court agreements concluded in 
civil or commercial matters,” and for the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments resulting from proceedings based on 
such agreements.1  Mexico ratified the Convention in September 
2007; the United States and the European Community became 
signatories in early 2009.2  This treaty contains mandatory 
standards that, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, preempt contrary state or federal law in cases where 
the Convention applies.3 
This Article examines the impact of the Convention on the 
doctrines of forum non conveniens and transfer of venue in state 
and federal courts in the United States, on the removal of actions 
from state courts to federal courts, and on recognition of foreign 
money judgments.  Part II summarizes these doctrines as currently 
 
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law.  B.A., 1968, 
University of Michigan; J.D., 1971, University of Wisconsin; LL.M., 1978, Harvard 
University.   
1 Hague Convention on Private International Law, Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements art. 1, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294 [hereinafter Hague 
Convention]. 
2 See id. arts. 1(1), 2(1), 8(1), 25 (establishing that a country that has ratified or 
signed the Convention is referred to as a “Contracting State”).  For updated 
information on the status of the Convention, see Conference on Private 
International Law Status Table, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act 
=conventions.status&cid=98 (last visited Apr. 10, 2010). 
3  See infra notes 141–44 and accompanying text (listing the mandatory 
standards included in the Convention and how they preempt contrary state and 
federal law). 
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followed by our courts in cases where the Hague Convention does 
not apply.  Part III provides an overview of the key provisions of 
the Hague Convention.  The impact of this Convention on the 
domestic enforcement of forum selection clauses and on the 
doctrines forum non conveniens, transfer of venue, removal, and 
recognition of foreign judgments is examined in Part IV.  The 
Article concludes that although the Convention will not require a 
wholesale revision of these doctrines, it will preempt state and 
federal laws in some significant areas. 
2. DOCTRINES FOLLOWED IN COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES IN 
CASES WHERE THE HAGUE CONVENTION DOES NOT APPLY 
2.1. Forum Selection Clauses (Choice of Court Agreements) 
The vast majority of courts in the United States will enforce a 
choice of court agreement, often referred to as a “forum selection 
clause,” unless the resisting party shows that enforcement would 
be unreasonable and unjust.4  Enforcement will be denied only 
when the agreement is invalid based on contract formation 
principles, such as fraud, duress, or unequal bargaining power; is 
contrary to the public policy of the forum; or designates a forum 
that is so gravely inconvenient that it will effectively deprive a 
party of a meaningful day in court.5  However, a few states treat 
 
4 See Walter W. Heiser, Forum Selection Clauses in State Courts: Limitations on 
Enforcement After Stewart and Carnival Cruise, 45 FLA. L. REV. 361, 366–72 (1993) 
(noting that every federal circuit and the vast majority of states enforce a valid 
and reasonable forum selection clause); 1 ROBERT C. CASAD & WILLIAM B. 
RICHMAN, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS §§ 1–7 & 3–1[5][c][iv] (3d ed. 1998 & 2008 
Supp.) (providing a collection of cases involving prorogation agreements); M/S 
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972) (holding that forum 
selection clauses in commercial contracts are prima facie valid and enforceable 
unless unreasonable); Prof’l Ins. Corp. v. Sutherland, 700 So. 2d 347, 350 n.3 (Ala. 
1997) (collecting cases where courts re-evaluated their positions on forum 
selection clauses); Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court, 551 P.2d 1206, 
1209 (Cal. 1976) (holding choice of court agreement will be given effect unless it is 
unfair and unreasonable). 
5 See, e.g., Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12–19 (mentioning a number of situations where 
forum selection clauses would not be enforced); Smith, 551 P.2d at 1208–09 
(discussing the public policy cause for not enforcing a forum selection clause); see 
also Heiser, supra note 4, at 370–71 (discussing various standards for enforcement 
of forum selection clauses); CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 4, § 3-1[5][c][iv] 
(collecting cases discussing prorogation agreements).  Most courts view a forum 
selection clause as waiving any possible objection to the contractually designated 
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forum selection clauses less favorably.6  Some impose additional 
prerequisites to enforcement, such as that there be a rational basis 
for the party’s forum choice; others flatly refuse to enforce forum 
selection clauses in certain cases.7 
A forum selection clause may be either exclusive (often referred 
to as “mandatory”) or nonexclusive (“permissive”).  An exclusive 
agreement requires that litigation be commenced only in the 
contractually designated forum.  In contrast, a nonexclusive 
agreement authorizes litigation in a designated forum, but does not 
prohibit litigation elsewhere.  The determination of whether a 
particular agreement is exclusive or nonexclusive depends on the 
intent of the parties, which in turn requires an interpretation of the 
language of the agreement.8 
There does not appear to be a uniform approach to this 
important determination.9  Some courts are reluctant to find that a 
forum selection clause is exclusive, requiring an agreement that 
designates one forum to also contain specific language that clearly 
excludes jurisdiction elsewhere.10  For example, one lower court 
concluded the clause, “Place of jurisdiction shall be Dresden” in an 
international commercial contract was permissive because it only 
specified jurisdiction and no other language indicated the parties’ 
 
forum’s lack of personal jurisdiction.  See Heiser, supra note 4, at 378–93 
(discussing the waivable nature of a defendant’s personal jurisdiction right). 
6 See Heiser, supra note 4, at 371–72; CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 4, § 1–7, 
n.203 (collecting cases where both federal and state courts have enforced 
prorogation agreements so long as they are just and reasonable). 
7 E.g., Jetbroadband WV, LLC v. MasTec N. Am., Inc., 13 So. 3d 159, 161–62 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (discussing Florida’s restrictions on enforcement of 
forum selection clauses); Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Sys. Corp., 971 P.2d 1240, 1244 
(Mont. 1998) (voiding forum selection clause because Montana statute protects 
Montana residents from having to litigate outside of Montana); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 
22B-3 (2009) (declaring certain forum selection clauses void and unenforceable). 
8 See cases cited infra notes 10–15 (applying various approaches to 
interpretation of exclusivity of forum selection clauses). 
9 See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN 
UNITED STATES COURTS, 446–60 (4th ed. Aspen Pub. 2007) (discussing various 
approaches to the enforceability of international forum selection agreements). 
10 E.g., K & V Scientific Co. v. BMW, 314 F.3d 494, 499 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing 
cases where courts consider the exclusiveness of forum selection clauses); John 
Boutari & Son, Wines & Spirits, S.A. v. Attiki Imps. & Distribs. Inc., 22 F.3d 51, 52 
(2d Cir. 1994) (holding that a forum selection clause was not mandatory because it 
did not contain language making it so); Paper Express, Ltd. v. Pfankuch 
Maschinen, 972 F.2d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[W]here venue is specified with 
mandatory or obligatory language, the clause will be enforced; where only 
jurisdiction is specified, the clause will generally not be enforced . . . .”). 
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intent to make venue exclusive.11  Moreover, if a clause is 
ambiguous, i.e., capable of being construed as either permissive or 
mandatory, the clause will be construed against the drafter.12 
Other courts apply more neutral principles of contract 
interpretation.  A forum selection clause will be deemed exclusive 
if the forum is designated with mandatory language.13  Under this 
approach, a clause knowingly incorporated into a contract should 
not be treated as “meaningless and redundant” by ignoring the 
likely reason for its existence.14  Moreover, a clause will be deemed 
exclusive where the agreement as a whole evinces this intent, 
despite the absence of typical mandatory terms such as “shall,” 
“only,” or “must.”15   
2.2. The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens 
The common law doctrine of forum non conveniens permits a 
trial court to dismiss an action where an alternative forum is 
available in another country and that forum is substantially more 
convenient for the parties, the witnesses, or the court.16  The 
 
11 Hull 753 Corp. v. Elbe Flugzeugwerke GmbH, 58 F. Supp. 2d 925, 927 
(N.D. Ill. 1999). 
12 See K & V Scientific, 314 F.3d at 500–01 (citing cases from various federal 
circuits that have held this interpretation). 
13 E.g., Sterling Forest Assocs., Ltd. v. Barnett-Range Corp., 840 F.2d 249, 251–
52 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that the language “shall be” created a mandatory 
forum selection clause); General Electric Co. v. G. Siempelkamp & Co., 29 F.3d 
1095, 1099 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that the language “all” and “shall” was 
mandatory). 
14 Sterling Forest, 840 F.2d at 251. 
15 E.g., Rivera v. Centro Medico de Turabo, Inc., 575 F.3d 10, 17–18 & n.5 (1st 
Cir. 2009) (holding a forum selection clause was mandatory based on context of 
the contract and not specific words); Furry v. First Nat’l Monetary Corp., 602 F. 
Supp. 6, 9 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (holding that a forum selection clause is mandatory 
based on context and intent of parties, without specific words making it 
mandatory).   
16 E.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 261 (1981) (granting a forum 
non conveniens motion); Stangvik v. Shiley Inc., 819 P.2d 14, 17 (Cal. 1991) 
(concluding that California was an inconvenient forum).  Much of this general 
discussion of forum non conveniens has been stated elsewhere.  See Walter W. 
Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Retaliatory Legislation: The Impact on the Available 
Alternative Forum Inquiry and on the Desirability of Forum Non Conveniens as a 
Defense Tactic, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 609, 611–18 (2008) [hereinafter Heiser, Forum Non 
Conveniens and Retaliatory Legislation] (examining the impact of retaliatory 
legislation on the use of forum non conveniens); Walter W. Heiser, Forum Non 
Conveniens and Choice of Law: The Impact of Applying Foreign Law in Transnational 
Tort Actions, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1161, 1165–68 (2005) [hereinafter Heiser,  Forum Non 
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doctrine varies somewhat from state to state, but most jurisdictions 
have adopted an approach similar to that set forth by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert17 and Piper Aircraft Co. v. 
Reyno.18  A defendant filing a forum non conveniens motion seeks 
dismissal of the action not because the chosen forum lacks 
jurisdiction—most transnational actions are filed in the state where 
the defendant resides—but because there is an alternative forum in 
another country which also has jurisdiction and, in addition, is far 
more convenient.19 
In assessing whether a forum non conveniens dismissal is 
appropriate, a court must first determine whether an adequate 
alternative forum is available.20  Generally, a forum is considered 
adequate and available if the defendant is subject to personal 
jurisdiction there and no other procedural bar, such as the statute 
of limitations, prevents resolution of the merits in the alternative 
forum.21  The possibility of an unfavorable change in substantive or 
 
Conveniens and Choice of Law] (detailing how forum non conveniens operates to 
protect U.S. companies). 
17  Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).  Gilbert dealt with the federal 
common law doctrine of forum non conveniens in federal courts.  Most states, by 
statute or by case law, have incorporated Gilbert’s private and public interest 
factors into their forum non conveniens doctrine.  See Heiser, supra note 4, at 395 
n.198 (citing authorities detailing the incorporation of Gilbert’s factors); CASAD & 
RICHMAN, supra note 4, § 1-4 (collecting cases regarding forum non conveniens 
disputes); Martin Davies, Time to Change the Federal Forum Non Conveniens 
Analysis, 77 TUL. L. REV. 309, 315–16 & nn.17–18 (2002) (collecting cases using 
Gilbert’s private and public interest factors); David W. Robertson & Paula K. 
Speck, Access to State Courts in Transnational Personal Injury Cases: Forum Non 
Conveniens and Antisuit Injunctions, 68 TEX. L. REV. 937, 948–53 & nn.68–88 (1990) 
(collecting authorities regarding the incorporation of Gilbert). 
18  Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 235.  See authorities cited supra note 16 (citing 
sources that offer a general discussion of forum non conveniens). 
19 Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 506–09.  See also Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 256 (“The 
central purpose of any forum non conveniens inquiry is to ensure that the trial is 
convenient.”). 
20 Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 255 n.22; Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 17.  The 
“adequate alternative forum” prerequisite rarely prevents a U.S. court from 
granting a forum non conveniens motion.  See Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and 
Retaliatory Legislation, supra note 16, at 614–18 (“Only where… specifically proven 
to be corrupt or biased and incapable of acting impartially… will a court find an 
alternative forum inadequate.”); Megan Waples, The Adequate Alternative Forum 
Analysis in Forum Non Conveniens: A Case for Reform, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1475, 1501 
(2004) (reviewing cases and concluding foreign plaintiffs have very little success 
defeating a forum non conveniens motion on the basis of the adequacy of the 
alternative forum). 
21 Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 255 n.22; Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 18.  Defendants 
routinely stipulate that they will waive any objections to the alternative forum 
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procedural law is ordinarily not a consideration relevant to the 
forum non conveniens analysis, unless the remedy provided by the 
alternative forum is “so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it 
is no remedy at all.”22  
If a court determines that an adequate alternative forum is 
available, the court must then balance a variety of private and 
public interests associated with the litigation.  As identified in 
Gilbert, the factors pertaining to the private interests of the litigants 
include “the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability 
of compulsory process for attendance of willing witnesses; 
possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the 
action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case 
easy, expeditious and inexpensive.”23 
The public interest factors identified in Gilbert include the 
administrative difficulties for courts “when litigation is piled up in 
congested centers instead of being handled at its origin,” the “local 
interest in having localized controversies decided at home,” the 
interest in having the trial in a forum that is at home with the law 
that must govern the action, the burden of jury duty imposed upon 
the citizens of a community which has no relation to the litigation, 
and the avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflicts of law or in 
the application of unfamiliar foreign law.24  These public and 
private interest factors are to be applied flexibly by the courts, 
without giving undue emphasis to any one element.25  The 
balancing of these various factors, as well as the ultimate 
 
based on personal jurisdiction or statute of limitations, and trial courts typically 
make such waivers a condition of the forum non conveniens dismissal, rendering 
these considerations non-factors.  See Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Choice of 
Law, supra note 16, at 1171 (discussing cases involving waivers). 
22 Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 254; Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 19 n.5 (pointing out 
uncertainty in the language used in Piper Aircraft Co.).  The “no remedy at all” 
component of the “adequate alternative forum” inquiry rarely precludes forum 
non conveniens dismissals in transnational cases.  See Heiser, Forum Non 
Conveniens and Choice of Law, supra note 16, at 1172–74 (discussing cases proving 
the “no remedy at all” inquiry rarely precludes dismissal). 
23 Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508. 
24 Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508–09; accord Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 241 n.6 
(quoting Gilbert). 
25 E.g., Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 249–50 (stressing the need for flexibility); 
Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 18–19 (protecting the flexibility of the doctrine). 
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determination of whether to grant or deny the forum non 
conveniens motion, is typically left to the trial court’s discretion.26 
Where the plaintiff is a resident of the forum state, there is 
ordinarily a strong presumption in favor of a plaintiff’s choice of 
forum, which may be overcome only when the private and public 
interest factors clearly point towards trial in the alternative 
forum.27  However, this presumption disappears when the plaintiff 
is a resident of a foreign country.28  A nonresident plaintiff’s choice 
of forum is accorded little deference because that choice is viewed 
as based on choice-of-law considerations, not on convenience.29  
Consequently, a foreign plaintiff’s choice of a United States forum 
rarely is a significant factor in favor of retaining jurisdiction.30 
2.3. Forum Selection Clauses and Forum Non Conveniens 
Courts sometimes confront an issue involving the relationship 
between forum selection clauses and the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens.  This arises when a plaintiff files an action in the court 
designated as the exclusive forum in a choice of court agreement, 
but the defendant nevertheless seeks dismissal based on forum non 
conveniens.  The contractually designated court must decide 
whether the existence of a choice of court agreement precludes 
granting the forum non conveniens motion. 
In several instances, courts have determined that an exclusive 
choice of forum agreement does not preclude the court from 
granting a forum non conveniens motion, even though the effect is 
dismissal of the case from the contractually mandated forum.31  
 
26 Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 257.  See Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508–09 (discussing 
the factors to be balanced); Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 17 (addressing the court’s role in 
balancing the factors). 
27 Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 255. 
28 Id. at 256; Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 20. 
29 Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 251–52.  See Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 
274 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 2001) (en banc) (ruling that “the more it appears that the 
plaintiff’s choice of a U.S. forum was motivated by forum-shopping reasons. . . the 
less deference the plaintiff’s choice commands”).   
30 E.g., Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 255–56 (asserting that the presumption of 
deference for plaintiff’s choice of forum is weakened when the plaintiff is foreign); 
Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 20 (asserting that deference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum 
only happens when the forum chosen is the plaintiff’s state of residence).   
31 E.g., Life of Am. Ins. Co. v. Baker-Lowe-Fox Ins. Mktg., Inc., 873 S.W.2d 
537, 540 (Ark. 1994) (affirming a forum non conveniens dismissal despite an 
agreement mandating an Arkansas forum); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Hartford 
Accident & Indem. Co., 555 N.E.2d 214, 218–19 (Mass. 1990) (commenting that a 
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According to these courts, a forum agreement removes only the 
parties’ private convenience interests from consideration, but not 
the various other private and public interests relevant in the forum 
non conveniens analysis.32  The parties have no power to 
contractually waive the various public interest factors or the 
private ones of third parties, such as the convenience of witnesses, 
jurors, judges, and the judicial system.33  Consequently, in cases 
where the Hague Convention does not apply, the existence of an 
exclusive choice of court agreement may not preclude a forum non 
conveniens dismissal.34   
2.4. Forum Selection Clauses and Section 1404(a) Motions to Transfer 
Venue in Federal Courts 
Section 1404(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides: 
“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of 
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other 
 
forum selection clause cannot bar the use of forum non conveniens because it 
involves public as well as private interests); Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Superior 
Court, 208 Cal. Rptr. 627, 633 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that various public 
interest factors cannot be automatically outweighed by the existence of a purely 
private agreement); Sarieddine v. Moussa, 820 S.W.2d 837, 840 (Tex. App. 1991) 
(holding as well that various public interest factors cannot be automatically 
outweighed by the existence of a purely private agreement); Package Express Cr., 
Inc. v. Snider Foods, Inc., 788 S.W.2d 561, 564–65 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (affirming 
a forum non conveniens dismissal despite the existence of a mandatory forum 
selection clause designating a Tennessee court).   
32 See cases cited supra note 31 (listing courts which have determined that an 
exclusive choice of forum agreement does not preclude the court from granting a 
forum non conveniens motion, even though the effect is dismissal of the case from 
the contractually mandated forum). 
33 Id.  See also Heiser, supra note 4, at 394–401 (explaining why the public 
interest factors and some of the private interest factors are not subject to 
contractual waiver).   
34 See cases cited supra note 31 (citing cases in which courts have granted a 
forum non conveniens motion, even though the effect is dismissal of the case from 
the contractually mandated forum).  Of course, a permissive or non-exclusive 
choice of court agreement will have little effect on a court’s willingness to grant a 
forum non conveniens dismissal.  E.g., Blanco v. Banco Industrial de Venezuela, 
997 F.2d 974, 979–80 (2d Cir. 1993) (rejecting use of the heightened Bremen 
standard used in mandatory forum provision cases because of the permissive 
forum provision); Brooke Group Ltd. v. JCH Syndicate 488, 663 N.E.2d 635, 638 
(N.Y. 1996) (stating that the service of suit clause does not mandate the forum, 
thereby allowing for dismissal on conveniens grounds); Berg v. MTC Elec. Techs. 
Co., 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 523, 528–29 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (demonstrating the lower 
standard of review for permissive forum clauses relative to the high standard of 
“unfair of unreasonable” for mandatory forum clauses). 
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district or division where it might have been brought.”35  Section 
1404(a) is a codification and revision of the common law forum 
non conveniens doctrine set forth in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert.36  
However, unlike forum non conveniens, which applies in federal 
courts where the alternative forum is in another country, section 
1404(a) applies when a party or the court seeks transfer of venue 
from one federal district court to another.37  A federal court can 
order transfer under section 1404(a) on a lesser showing of 
inconvenience than is necessary for dismissal, and can exercise 
broader discretion than would be permitted under the common 
law forum non conveniens doctrine.38 
In Stewart Organization v. Ricoh Corp.,39 the Supreme Court 
clarified the relationship between a forum selection clause and a 
section 1404(a) motion to transfer venue.  The Court ruled that the 
existence of an exclusive forum selection clause does not preclude 
a federal district court in the contractually designated location 
from transferring the lawsuit to a federal district court in another 
state.40  The Court reasoned that section 1404(a) is intended to give 
the district court discretion to adjudicate motions for transfer based 
on an “individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience 
and fairness.”41  As to the weight accorded a forum selection 
clause, the Court simply noted that flexible and individualized 
analysis under section 1404(a) encompasses “consideration of the 
parties’ private expression of their venue preferences.”42  A forum 
selection clause “should receive neither dispositive consideration 
nor no consideration” the Court ruled, “but rather the 
consideration for which Congress provided in § 1404(a).”43  
 
35 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006). 
36 See supra notes 23–26 and accompanying text for a discussion of the private 
and public interest factors relevant under the Gilbert court’s forum non 
conveniens analysis. 
37 See American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 449 n.2 (1994) (noting 
that the doctrine of forum non conveniens in federal court applies only where the 
alternative forum is in another country). 
38 See Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955) (finding that Congress 
intended to allow courts to “grant transfers upon a lower showing of 
inconvenience”).   
39 Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988). 
40 See id. at 28–31 (“The forum-selection clause. . . should receive neither 
dispositive consideration. . . nor no consideration . . . .”) 
41 Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964). 
42 Stewart, 487 U.S. at 30. 
43 Id. at 31. 
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As with forum non conveniens, a section 1404(a) transfer 
motion requires a trial court to consider a variety of public interest 
factors pursuant to the statutory directive that the transfer be “in 
the interest of justice.”44  These public interest factors cannot be 
waived by private parties in a contract, and must be taken into 
account by a court despite the existence of a mandatory forum 
selection clause.45  “Likewise, some private interest factors, 
particularly the convenience of certain independent witnesses in 
limited circumstances, may be beyond party control and be 
considered regardless of a forum selection clause.”46  Several lower 
federal court decisions have adopted this reasoning, granting 
section 1404(a) transfers of venue despite exclusive choice of court 
agreements.47 
2.5. Forum Selection Clauses and Removal Jurisdiction 
Pursuant to section 1441 of Title 28 of the United States Code, a 
defendant may remove a case initiated in state court to the federal 
district court sitting in the place where such action is pending.48  
 
44 Stewart, 487 U.S. at 30-31.  See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 529–
30 (1990) (observing that courts should consider the interests of witnesses and the 
court as well as the convenience of parties when evaluating § 1404(a) motions); 
Parsons v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 375 U.S. 71, 72–73 (1963) (noting that a § 
1404(a) transfer motion and a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens involve 
similar, but not identical, criteria). 
45 See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 30 (Section 1404(a) directs a district court to “take 
account of factors other than those that bear solely on the parties’ private ordering 
of their affairs”); Walter W. Heiser, Forum Selection Clauses in Federal Courts: 
Limitations on Enforcement after Stewart and Carnival Cruise, 45 FLA. L. REV. 553, 571–
74 (1993) (discussing how courts must take into account many public interest 
factors in order to ensure that the transfer comports with the purpose of § 
1404(a)). 
46 Heiser, supra note 45, at 572; see Stewart, 487 U.S. at 30–31 (noting that 
analysis under § 1404(a) includes “consideration of the parties’ private expression 
of the venue preferences”).  
47 E.g., APA Excelsior III v. Premiere Tech., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 664, 671–73 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (approving transfer of venue despite forum selection clause); 
McNic Oil & Gas Co. v. Ibex Res. Co., 23 F. Supp. 2d 729, 737– (E.D. Mich. 1998) 
(approving transfer of venue despite Michigan forum selection clauses); Standard 
Office Sys. of Fort Smith, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 742 F. Supp. 534 (W.D. Ark. 1990) 
(denying transfer to New York of venue despite forum selection clause in sales 
agreement); see CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 4, at 54 n.207 (listing cases where 
transfers to a chosen forum were denied and those where transfers from a chosen 
forum were allowed); Heiser, supra note 45, at 573–74 n.94 (discussing a survey of 
forty-four district court decisions applying Stewart to forum selection clauses in § 
1404(a) transfer motions). 
48 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)–(d) (2006). 
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Removal is authorized only when the United States District Court 
has original subject matter jurisdiction over the action, except in 
actions founded on diversity of citizenship, which are removable 
only if none of the defendants is a citizen of the state in which the 
action is brought.49  Procedurally, when a defendant files a petition 
for removal in the federal court, the case is removed automatically 
from state court.50  If the plaintiff wishes to challenge the propriety 
of removal, he must then file a motion to remand the case back to 
state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447.51 
Some forum selection clauses designate a specific state court as 
the exclusive forum to adjudicate contract-related disputes.  
Several U.S. Courts of Appeals have considered whether to enforce 
such a contractual provision and remand the action back to state 
court.  All have decided to enforce forum selection clauses that 
specify adjudication in state, rather than federal, court.52  These 
courts view the right to removal as a waivable statutory right—a 
right the defendant can waive in advance by contract.53  Therefore, 
generally, a carefully drafted choice of court agreement that 
 
49 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)–(b) (2006). 
50 See 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (2006) (governing the procedure for removal from a 
state court). 
51 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (2006). 
52 E.g., Yakin v. Tyler Hill Corp., 566 F.3d 72, 73 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming 
district court’s remand of personal injury suit to state court based on forum 
selection clause), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 401 (2009); American Soda, LLP v. U.S. 
Filter Wastewater Group, Inc., 428 F.3d 921 (10th Cir. 2005) (affirming district 
court’s remand of breach of contract suit to state court based on forum selection 
clause); Russell Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 264 F.3d 1040 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(holding that defendant in insurance coverage dispute had waived ability to 
consent to removal by including service of suit clause in policy); Roberts & 
Schaefer Co. v. Merit Contracting, Inc., 99 F.3d 248 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding 
forum selection clause specifying state court forum in breach of contract suit); 
Foster v. Chesapeake Ins. Co., 933 F.2d 1207, 1214 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that 
forum selection clause waived reinsurer’s right to remove suit originally filed in 
state court); City of Rose City v. Nutmeg Ins. Co., 931 F.2d 13, 16 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(holding that defendant in insurance coverage dispute had waived ability to seek 
removal by including service of suit clause in policy).  But see Morgan v. Nat’l 
Distillers & Chem. Corp., 900 F.2d 890, 894 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that inclusion 
of forum selection clause in contract did not constitute waiver of right to seek 
removal where party seeking removal was agency or instrumentality of foreign 
state within the meaning of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).   
53 See cases cited supra note 52 (citing circuit court cases where the court has 
affirmed the removal of cases specifying state court venue).  
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designates a state court as the exclusive forum will preclude a 
lawsuit from being heard in federal court.54  
2.6. Recognition of Foreign Judgments and Forum Selection Clauses 
2.6.1. Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, Generally 
As often noted, there is no international Full Faith and Credit 
Clause.55  Consequently, each country is free to adopt whatever 
standards for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments it 
deems appropriate.56  Beginning in the late 19th century, 
jurisdictions in the United States generally recognized foreign 
judgments on grounds of comity.57  Prior to the decision in Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,58 the standards for recognition by federal 
courts were based on federal common law.59  “After Erie, unless a 
treaty or federal statute applies, the relevant standards are matters 
 
54 A possible exception to this general rule is a lawsuit removed to federal 
court under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (2006).  See 
Morgan, 900 F.2d at 893 (noting that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
provides a foreign state absolute right of removal to federal courts by a foreign 
state to resolve sovereign immunity issues). 
55 See, e.g., Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of Foreign Money-Judgments in the 
United States: In Search of Uniformity and International Acceptance, 67 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 253, 258–65 (1991) (discussing the recognition of foreign judgments in United 
States federal courts); Katherine R. Miller, Playground Politics: Assessing the Wisdom 
of Writing a Reciprocity Requirement into U.S. International Recognition and 
Enforcement Law, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 239, 243–44 (2004) (stating that the recognition 
of foreign judgments is not required by the text of the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
nor does such recognition fit within the clause’s original purpose); Linda J. 
Silberman, The Impact of Jurisdictional Rules and Recognition Practice on International 
Business Transactions: The U.S. Regime, 26 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 327, 352 (2004) (noting 
that the United States’ Full Faith and Credit Clause does not address foreign 
judgments).    
56 Much of this general discussion of recognition of foreign money judgments 
has been stated elsewhere.  See Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Retaliatory 
Legislation, supra note 16, at 634–38 (discussing the recognition of foreign 
judgments in the United States and particularly under the Uniform Foreign 
Money-Judgments Recognition Act). 
57 See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895) (providing a discussion on 
the principle of comity in order to support the court’s use of the principle); Brand, 
supra note 55, at 258–62 (discussing the application of the comity principle in 
American courts).   
58 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
59 See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163 (relying on the federal common law principle of 
comity rather than a state law). 
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for state law.”60  Because no comprehensive treaty or federal 
statute currently exists, recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments is now governed by state law.61 
A majority of states has enacted a highly influential model law, 
the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act of 1962 
(UFMJRA)62 or its 2005 revision, the Uniform Foreign-Country 
Money Judgments Recognition Act.63  Many of the remaining states 
have adopted the standards of the UFMJRA or of the substantially 
similar Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, as their 
common law doctrine.64  “As a result, even though state law 
governs, the grounds for recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments are nearly the same in any court in the United States.”65  
Therefore, for purposes of analysis, this Article will treat the 
provisions of the UFMJRA as setting forth the relevant standards 
 
60 Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Retaliatory Legislation, supra note 16, at 
634; see also Brand, supra note 55, at 262–68 (discussing state rules with regard to 
foreign judgments and complications that federal courts incur in applying state 
rules); Miller, supra note 55, at 251 (stating that after the Erie decision, federal 
courts have agreed that state law governs the question of recognition of foreign 
judgments). 
61 Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Retaliatory Legislation, supra note 16, at 
634.   
62 UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 U.L.A. 39 (2002) 
[hereinafter UFMJRA].  To date, 30 states have enacted the UFMJRA.  Id.   
63 UNIFORM FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (U.L.A.) 
(Supp. 2008).  For the most part, the 2005 Uniform Act is a clarification of the 
standards set forth in the earlier UFMJRA.  To date, 3 states have enacted the 2005 
Uniform Act.  Id. at 5. 
64 E.g., Society of Lloyd’s v. Reinhart, 402 F.3d 982, 999 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(applying Utah’s common law principles of comity, where Utah has not adopted 
the UFMJRA); Alberta Sec. Com’n v. Ryckman, 30 P.3d 121, 126–27 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2001) (applying the Restatement as Arizona’s common law recognition doctrine); 
Petition of Breau, 565 A.2d 1044, 1049–50 (N.H. 1989) (relying on the Restatement 
to determine recognition of foreign judgment);  see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 481–82 (1987) (discussing cases that apply §§ 481–82); 
Brand, supra note 55, at 265–83 (comparing the UFMJRA’s and the Restatement’s 
recognition standards). 
65 Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Retaliatory Legislation, supra note 16, at 
635.  Pursuant to the command of Erie, a federal court must also apply state law 
when determining whether to recognize or enforce a foreign judgment.  E.g., 
McCord v. Jet Spray Int’l Corp., 874 F. Supp. 436, 438 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1994) (noting 
that a majority of cases hold that “federal courts should use state law in 
determining the preclusive effect of foreign judgments”); Resolution Trust Corp. 
v. Ruggiero, 994 F.2d 1221, 1226 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that in the absence of a 
federal statute, a court will utilize the procedure of a state court in proceedings to 
execute a federal judgment). 
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with respect to whether a court in the United States will enforce a 
foreign money judgment.66 
The UFMJRA “applies to any foreign judgment for [money 
damages] that is final and conclusive and enforceable where 
rendered . . . .”67  Under the UFMJRA, such a foreign judgment “is 
enforceable in the same manner as the judgment of a sister state 
which is entitled to full faith and credit,” unless one the UFMJRA’s 
grounds for nonrecognition applies.68  The references here to 
“sister state” judgments and “full faith and credit” are significant 
because they incorporate an important aspect of enforcement of 
sister state judgments under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the 
United States Constitution, i.e., that the enforcing court can not 
review the merits of an otherwise valid judgment rendered in 
another state.69 
2.6.2. Mandatory Grounds for Nonrecognition of Foreign 
Judgments 
Two grounds for mandatory nonrecognition of a foreign 
judgment under the UFMJRA are that the foreign court lacked 
personal jurisdiction or lacked subject matter jurisdiction.70  The 
UFMJRA contains a non-exclusive list of the proper bases for the 
assertion of personal jurisdiction over a defendant by the foreign 
court, generally tracking the Supreme Court’s various holdings 
under the Due Process Clause.71  One specified basis is where “the 
defendant prior to the commencement of the proceedings had 
agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign court with 
respect to the subject matter involved.”72  In other words, 
recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment cannot be 
 
66 However, the 2005 version of the Uniform Act does contain some 
additional grounds for nonrecognition of foreign judgments not specified in the 
1962 Act.  These new grounds will be discussed in this Article where relevant.  See 
infra text accompanying notes 92–93 (discussing grounds for nonrecognition 
introduced in the 2005 version). 
67 UFMJRA § 2; 13 U.L.A. 46 (2002). 
68 Id. § 3. 
69 See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908) (stating that the merits of a 
judgment given in another state cannot be reviewed by an enforcing court). 
70 UFMJRA § 4(a)(2)–(3). 
71 Id. § 5. 
72 Id. § 5(a)(3). 
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refused for lack of personal jurisdiction if the litigation proceeded 
in the foreign court pursuant to a valid forum selection clause.73 
The third and final mandatory ground for nonrecognition 
under the UFMJRA is that “the judgment was rendered under a 
system which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures 
compatible with the requirements of due process of law.”74  Most 
courts interpret this reference to “due process” to mean that the 
foreign procedures must only be “fundamentally fair” and not 
offend against “basic fairness.”75  This mandatory basis for 
nonrecognition does not mean that a foreign country’s procedures 
must incorporate all the specific due process requirements 
reflected in procedures in United States courts.76  Foreign 
 
73 E.g., Genujo Lok Beteiligungs GMBH v. Zorn, 943 A.2d 573, 580 (Me. 2008) 
(finding that the forum selection clause provided a foreign court the authority to 
exercise personal jurisdiction over the parties).   
74 UFMJRA § 4(a)(1); 13 U.L.A. 59 (2002).  With respect to the question of 
impartiality, the appropriate inquiry is whether the judicial system is an 
independent branch of the foreign country’s government and is capable of 
administering, and does in fact administer justice in a fair manner.  See S.C. 
Chimexim S.A. v. Velco Enter., Ltd., 36 F. Supp. 2d 206, 213–15 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) 
(finding Romanian court systems provided impartial tribunals in compliance with 
the due process requirements).  Only where a foreign tribunal is specifically 
proven to be corrupt or biased and incapable of acting impartially with respect to 
the defendant, should a United States court find that the foreign legal system 
lacks impartiality.  See, e.g., Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134, 137–38, 
142–44 (2d Cir. 2000) (refusing to enforce a Liberian judgment because the court 
found that Liberia’s judicial system was in disarray); Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 
58 F.3d 1406, 1410–1413 (9th Cir. 1995) (refusing to enforce Iranian judgment 
against the sister of the Shah of Iran because after the Shah was deposed, the 
Iranian judicial system did not provide her with fair treatment or basic due 
process). 
75 E.g., Soc’y Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000) (referring 
to the American concept of due process as “complex”); Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Turner, 
303 F.3d 325, 330 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[F]oreign proceedings need not comply with the 
traditional rigors of American due process . . .”).  Some courts even call this the 
“international concept of due process” to distinguish it from the complex 
understanding of due process that has emerged in the United States courts.  E.g., 
Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 477 (interpreting that the due process in the Illinois Uniform 
Foreign Money-Judgment Recognition Act refers to the concept of fair procedure); 
Soc’y of Lloyds v. Webb, 156 F. Supp. 2d 632, 641 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (“International 
due process is a more flexible approach . . .”);  see Montré D. Carodine, Political 
Judging: When Due Process Goes International, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159, 1162 
(2007) (examining the “extent to which [U.S.] courts should apply American 
notions of due process in determining whether to recognize and enforce 
judgments obtained abroad.”). 
76 According to the drafters of the UFMJRA, “a mere difference in the 
procedural system is not a sufficient basis for nonrecognition.  A case of serious 
injustice must be involved.”  UFMJRA § 4 cmt., 13 U.L.A. 59 (2002).  See Ingersoll 
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judgments have been enforced, for example, even though the 
foreign procedure did not include the right to cross-examine 
witnesses,77 prohibited the defendant from raising certain defenses 
and counterclaims,78 prohibited discovery as to the amount 
claimed by the plaintiff,79 or lacked a verbatim transcript.80  Also, 
this basis for nonrecognition apparently refers only to the 
requirements of procedural, not substantive, rights.81  The only 
substantive basis that the UFMJRA recognizes for non-enforcement 
 
Milling Mach. Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680, 687 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that the 
UFMJRA does not require that the procedures employed by a foreign tribunal be 
identical to those employed in American courts); Brand, supra note 55, at 271 
(“Where personal jurisdiction exists, procedures different from those in the 
United States enforcing court will not generally rise to the level of a violation of 
due process in the [enforcing] of a foreign judgment.”); see also sources cited supra 
note 75. 
77 E.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 139, 139 (1895) (finding that “[a] foreign 
judgment cannot be impeached because one of the plaintiffs was permitted to 
testify without being put under oath, and was not subjected to cross-examination . 
. . .”); Panama Servs. v. Cities Serv. Co., 796 P.2d 276, 285–86 (Okla. 1990) 
(observing that Panama’s argument did not rest on failure to receive “full and fair 
notice or that it was not given the opportunity to be heard in the Brazilian court” 
and thus a violation of due process, but rather it focused on the procedural 
difference); Ingersoll, 833 F.2d at 686–88 (dismissing the plaintiff’s claim that his 
waiver of his right to cross-examination equated to less than a “full and fair 
opportunity to present his claims”).   
78 See, e.g., Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 479–80 (“The rationale for the conclusive-
evidence clause, and for the denial of full discovery regarding the accuracy of the 
assessment, is similar to the rationale for the pay now sue later clause.”); Soc’y of 
Lloyd’s v. Mullin, 255 F. Supp. 2d 468, 472 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (defendant objected to 
the foreign court’s enforcement of a “pay-now-sue-later” clause, which prohibited 
defendant from raising certain defenses and counterclaims during the foreign 
action). 
79 See, e.g., Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 480 (“[P]retrial discovery is not a part of the 
U.S. concept of due process.”); Panama Servs., 796 P.2d at 286 (observing that 
Panama’s argument was based on procedural differences – differences that are not 
violations of due process.).  
80 See British Midland Airways, Ltd. v. Int’l Travel, Inc., 497 F.2d 869, 871 (9th 
Cir. 1974) (finding that an American corporation which agreed to be bound by 
foreign law when it entered into contract with a British company was not denied 
due process by action of foreign courts where it was American corporation’s 
“choice not to pursue the matter on appeal or take advantage of the conditional 
defense allowance”); Tonga Air Servs. v. Fowler, 826 P.2d 204, 212 (Wash. 1992) 
(en banc) (noting that the absence of a verbatim transcript of the proceedings does 
not violate due process). 
81 See Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 480 (observing that “the cases that deal with 
international due process” speak only of procedural rights). 
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of a foreign judgment is that the judgment is repugnant to the 
public policy of the enforcing state.82   
2.6.3. Discretionary Grounds for Nonrecognition of Foreign 
Judgments 
The UFMJRA also specifies several discretionary grounds for 
nonrecognition.  For example, a foreign judgment need not be 
recognized where the defendant did not receive proper notice of 
the foreign court proceeding, the judgment was obtained by fraud 
or it conflicts with another final judgment, or where the proceeding 
in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement to litigate the 
dispute in another court.83 
Another discretionary ground for nonrecognition under the 
UFMJRA is that the “cause of action” on which the judgment is 
based is “repugnant to the public policy” of the state in which the 
enforcing court sits.84  Although this public policy exception defies 
easy interpretation, most courts give it a very narrow 
construction.85  This exception operates only in those unusual cases 
where the foreign judgment is “repugnant to fundamental notions 
of what is decent and just in the State where enforcement is 
sought.”86  Because the focus is on the “cause of action,” some 
 
82 Id.  The “public policy” exception to recognition is discussed infra in the 
text accompanying notes 84–91. 
83 UFMJRA §§ 4(b)(1)–(2), (4), & (5), 13 U.L.A. 46 (2002).  
84 UFMJRA § 4(b)(3). 
85 See, e.g., Southwest Livestock and Trucking Co. v. Ramón, 169 F.3d 317, 321 
(5th Cir. 1999) (noting the narrowness of the public policy exception and that the 
level of contravention of forum law must be high); Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 
830, 841 (2d Cir. 1986) (observing that the standard to satisfy the public policy 
exception is high and infrequently met); Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Mullin, 255 F. Supp. 
2d 468, 475 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (reviewing cases and adopting a “high standard” with 
respect to the scope of the public policy exception), aff’d, 96 Fed. Appx. 100 (3d 
Cir. 2004).  See also Brand, supra note 55, at 275–76 (noting that the public policy 
exception seldom has led to denial of enforcement); Silberman, supra note 55, at 
356–59 (noting that outside of the First Amendment area, the public policy 
exception has not posed a significant barrier to enforcement of foreign 
judgments). 
86 Ackermann, 788 F.2d at 841 (quoting Tahan v. Hodgeson, 662 F.2d 862, 864 
(D.C. Cir. 1981)).  One classic formulation is that a judgment is contrary to the 
public policy of the enforcing state where that judgment “tends clearly to 
undermine the public interest, the public confidence in the administration of the 
law, or security for individual rights of personal liberty or of private property.”  
Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 443 (3d Cir. 
1971). 
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courts have concluded that the proper inquiry is whether the 
substantive law applied in the foreign forum is contrary to public 
policy.87  However, the fact that the judgment offends the 
enforcement state’s public policy does not, in and of itself, permit 
the court to refuse recognition of that judgment.88 
Relying on the public policy exception, United States courts 
have refused to enforce foreign libel judgments where the foreign 
libel law was repugnant to the free speech values of the First 
Amendment.89  However, when the values involved are less 
fundamental than the constitutional right of free speech, courts 
usually enforce foreign judgments, even though the foreign cause 
of action reflects a policy judgment contrary to that of the 
corresponding domestic law.90  For example, United States courts 
 
87 See Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Siemon-Netto, 457 F.3d 94, 100 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
(recounting that Section 15-383(b)(3) of the Recognition Act permits 
nonrecognition of foreign judgments only if the cause of action is repugnant to 
public policy); Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Reinhart, 402 F.3d 982, 995 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(reiterating that the Court must focus on the cause of action); Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. 
Turner, 303 F.3d 325, 332 (5th Cir. 2002) (reiterating that, by the “plain language of 
the Texas Recognition Act,” the cause of action underlying a judgment must be 
contrary to public policy before nonrecognition of that judgment is allowed); 
Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 480 (“The only substantive basis . . . for not enforcing a 
foreign judgment is that ‘the cause of action on which the judgment is based is 
repugnant to the public policy’. . . .”). 
88 Ramon, 169 F.3d at 321.  See also cases cited supra note 87, which note that 
where the foreign judgment was not found to offend public policy the court may 
not refuse recognition of that judgment.  But see the recent revision to § 4(c)(3) of 
the UFMJRA discussed infra in text accompanying note 93, which provides for 
nonrecognition of judgments that offend public policy. 
89 See, e.g., Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L’anti-semitisme, 169 
F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (holding that French court order requiring ISP 
to block French citizens’ access to Nazi material on ISP’s United States site 
was unenforceable in the United States as it threatened the First Amendment), 
rev’d on other grounds, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).  See generally 
Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (showing refusal of U.S. 
courts to enforce British libel judgment that was contrary to First Amendment 
values); Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230 (Md. 1997) (confirming the 
holding from Matusevitch v. Telnikoff on same grounds); Bachchan v. India 
Abroad Publ’ns, Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (showing refusal of 
U.S. court to enforce a British libel judgment that it found offensive to the First 
Amendment). 
90 See, e.g., Turner, 303 F.3d at 332–33 (ruling that the public policy exception 
is not triggered “simply because the body of foreign law upon which the 
judgment is based is different from the law of the forum or because the foreign 
law is more favorable to the judgment creditor than the law of the forum” quoting 
Hunt v. BP Exploration Co., 492 F. Supp. 885, 901 (N.D. Tex. 1980)); Ackermann, 
788 F.2d at 843 (“It is not enough merely that a foreign judgment fails to fulfill 
domestic practice or policy.”).  See also authorities cited supra note 85 for the 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss4/1
2010] CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS 1031 
 
have enforced foreign judgments even though they were based on 
causes of action that would be prohibited, or at least not be 
recognized, in the enforcement forum.91 
The 2005 revision to the Uniform Act adds two new 
discretionary grounds for non-recognition:  “[T]he judgment was 
rendered in circumstances that raise substantial doubt about the 
integrity of the rendering court with respect to the judgment,” and 
“the specific proceeding in the foreign court leading to the 
judgment was not compatible with the requirements of due 
process of law.”92  The 2005 Act also clarifies two areas that have 
troubled courts when applying the 1962 Act.  First, the 2005 Act 
broadens the focus of the public policy exception by providing that 
a foreign judgment need not be recognized if “the . . . judgment or 
the [cause of action] . . . on which the . . . judgment is based is 
repugnant to the public policy of this state or of the United 
States.”93  Second, it specifies that the party resisting recognition 
has the burden of establishing that offered ground for 
nonrecognition exists within the Act.94 
The UFMJRA applies only to foreign judgments granting or 
denying recovery of a sum of money.95  However, a judgment for a 
“fine or other penalty” is specifically excluded.96  This phrase is not 
 
heightened level and narrowness by which courts interpret the public policy 
exception. 
91 See, e.g., Ramon, 169 F.3d at 317 (recognizing Mexican judgment on 
promissory note even though interest charged was usurious under Texas law); 
Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680, 691–92 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(enforcing Belgian judgment awarding prejudgment interest even though 
inappropriate under Illinois law); Somportex, 453 F.2d at 443 (enforcing British 
judgment that included damages for loss of good will and attorney fees even 
though Pennsylvania law did not allow recovery for loss of good will or attorney 
fees); Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Webb, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 632, 643–44 (N.D. Tex. 2001) 
(recognizing English judgment despite apparent conflict with Texas law that 
condemns cognovit judgments), aff’d, 303 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2002).  See Brand, supra 
note 55, at 275–76 nn.86–88 (collecting cases); Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, 
Construction and Application of Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, 88 
A.L.R. FED. 5th 545, 615–20 (2001 and Supp. 2009) (reviewing cases). 
92 UFMJRA, §§ 4(c)(7) & (8), 13 U.L.A. 46 (2002). 
93 Id. § 4(c)(3) (emphasis added).  The same stringent test for finding a public 
policy violation applied by courts interpreting the 1962 Act applies to the revised 
Act.  Id. § 4, cmt. 8.  See supra notes 84–91 and accompanying text (addressing the 
public policy exception under the UFMJRA). 
94 Id. § 4(d). 
95 Id. § 1(2).   
96 Id. § 1(2).  A judgment for taxes or for support in domestic relations matters 
is also excluded from coverage.  Id. 
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defined in the UFMJRA or its 2005 revision but may mean that a 
foreign judgment for punitive damages obtained by a private 
litigant is not covered, although enforcement may still be possible 
on the basis of comity.97  However, the fact that a foreign money 
judgment includes attorney fees and costs does not necessarily 
mean that judgment is a penalty or is contrary to the public policy 
of the enforcement forum.98 
Likewise, a foreign judgment granting non-monetary relief, 
such as specific performance or an injunction, is not within the 
scope of the UFMJRA.99  However, several courts have recognized 
and enforced non-monetary judgments based on comity 
principles.100  
 
97 See UFMJRA § 7 (providing that the “Act does not prevent the recognition 
of a foreign judgment in situations not covered by this Act.”); Heiser, Forum Non 
Conveniens and Retaliatory Legislation, supra note 16, at 649–53 (discussing 
enforcement of foreign judgments for punitive damages). 
98 See, e.g., Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 
443 (3d Cir. 1971) (enforcing British judgment including attorney fees even though 
Pennsylvania law did not allow recovery of attorney fees); ERBE Elektromedizin 
GmbH v. Canady, 545 F. Supp. 2d 491 (W.D.Pa. 2008) (holding foreign judgment 
for attorney fees was not a penalty and not repugnant to public policy even 
though attorney fees not recoverable under Pennsylvania or federal law); 
Desjardins Ducharme v. Hunnewell, 585 N.E.2d 321, 323 (Mass. 1992) (enforcing 
Canadian judgment for costs awarded based on percentage of amount in issue 
and not on actual costs). 
99 See UFMJA § 1(2) (restricting foreign judgments to include only judgments 
of “a foreign state granting or denying recovery of a sum of money”).   
100 See, e.g., Siko Ventures v. Argyll Equities, No. SA-05-CA-100-OG, 2005 WL 
2233205, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2005) (observing that “Texas courts have 
repeatedly recognized and enforced . . . sister-state judgments under comity 
principles”); Nahar v. Nahar, 656 So. 2d 225, 230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) 
(recognizing and enforcing decree of Aruban court ordering transfer of decedent’s 
Florida bank accounts to Aruba to be disposed of according to Dutch law); 
Cardenas v. Solis, 570 So. 2d 996, 999 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (recognizing and 
enforcing temporary injunction of Guatemalan court freezing funds in 
defendant’s Florida bank accounts).  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF 
LAWS § 102 cmt. g (1971) (indicating that a foreign nation decree that orders or 
enjoins an act will be enforced provided enforcement is necessary to effectuate the 
decree and will not impose an undue burden upon the American court, provided  
the decree is consistent with fundamental principles of justice). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss4/1
2010] CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS 1033 
 
3. THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS 
3.1. The Scope of the Hague Convention 
The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements sets 
forth uniform international rules for enforcing exclusive choice of 
court commercial transactions agreements between parties, and for 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments resulting from 
proceedings based on such agreements.101  The scope of this 
Convention is limited in several important ways.  First, the 
Convention applies only in “international cases.”102  For purposes 
of jurisdiction, a case is an “international case” unless the parties 
are residents of the same Contracting State and the dispute is 
connected only with that State.103 
Second, the Convention applies only to “exclusive choice of 
court agreements.”104  An “exclusive choice of court agreement” is 
one that designates one or more courts of one Contracting State to 
the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts.105  
Significantly, an agreement that designates one or more courts of 
one Contracting State is deemed exclusive unless the parties have 
expressly provided otherwise.106   
Third, the Convention applies only to “agreements concluded 
in civil or commercial matters.”107  It expressly does not apply to 
choice of court agreements in consumer or employment 
contracts.108  Moreover, several additional matters are specifically 
 
101 See Hague Convention, supra note 1, preamble (creating rules that would 
“promote international trade and investment through enhanced judicial co-
operation”).   
102 Id. arts. 1(2), (3). 
103 Id. art. 1(2). 
104 Id. arts. 1, 3 & 22.  However, Article 22 permits Contracting States through 
reciprocal declarations to extend the recognition and enforcement provisions of 
the Convention to non-exclusive choice of court agreements.  See also TREVOR C. 
HARTLEY & MASOTO DOGAUCHI, EXPLANATORY REPORT: CONVENTION OF 30 JUNE 
2005 ON CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS ¶¶240–255 (2007) [hereinafter 
EXPLANATORY REPORT] (discussing the provisions of Article 22.  This authoritative 
EXPLANATORY REPORT, contains article-by-article commentary reflecting the views 
of the Diplomatic Session which adopted the Convention), http://www 
.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.publications&dtid=3&cid=98.  
105 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. (3)(a). 
106 Id. art. 3(b). 
107 Id. art. 1(1). 
108 Id. art. 2(1).  
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excluded from coverage, including various family law matters, 
anti-trust claims, and most intellectual property (except copyright) 
matters.109  There is one particularly significant exclusion:  the 
Convention does not apply to personal injury claims “brought by 
or on behalf of natural persons.”110 
3.2. Jurisdiction of the Chosen Court and the Obligations of the Court 
Not Chosen 
Article 3 of the Convention defines an “exclusive choice of 
court agreement” to mean a written agreement that designates, for 
the purpose of deciding disputes which have arisen or may arise in 
connection with a particular legal relationship, “the courts of one 
Contracting State or one or more specific courts of one Contracting 
State to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts.”111  
Articles 5 and 6 then set forth the Convention’s basic rules with 
respect to the jurisdiction of the court chosen in an exclusive choice 
of court agreement, as well as the obligations of a court not chosen.   
Article 5(1) provides that the court of a Contracting State 
designated in an exclusive agreement “shall have jurisdiction to 
decide a dispute to which the agreement applies, unless the 
agreement is null and void under the law of that State.”112  Most 
significantly, under Article 5(2), the chosen court “shall not decline 
to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that the dispute should be 
decided in a court of another State.”113  The intent of this language 
is clear:  the chosen court must hear the case unless the agreement 
is “null and void,” and has no discretion to dismiss or stay the 
proceedings under the common law doctrine of forum non 
conveniens.114 
“The ’null and void’ provision is the only generally applicable 
exception to the rule that the chosen court must hear the case.”115  
 
109 Id. art. 2(2).  See also id. art. 2(5) (stating that proceedings in which a 
country or a government agency is a party are not necessarily excluded from the 
scope of the Convention).  But see id. art. 2(6) (discussing how the Convention 
does not affect the sovereign immunity of States or international organizations).  
110 Id. art. 2(2)(j).  
111 Id. art. 3(a). 
112 Id. art. 5(1). 
113 Id. art. 5(2). 
114 See EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 104, ¶¶132–34, at 44 (discussing 
Article 5(2)’s intent to preclude the chosen court from resorting to forum non 
conveniens or lis pendens). 
115 Id. ¶125, at 43. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss4/1
2010] CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS 1035 
 
The phrase “null and void” is not defined by the Convention, but 
apparently refers to generally recognized grounds for invalidating 
an agreement such as fraud, mistake, misrepresentation, duress, 
and lack of capacity.116  However, the Convention does not 
authorize the chosen court to refuse to enforce a choice of court 
agreement where enforcement would be contrary to the public 
policy of the State of the chosen court.117 
Article 5 of the Convention also contains two specific 
exceptions to the general rule that the designated court shall not 
decline jurisdiction.  Article 5(3)(a) states that the general rule of 
Article 5(1) and 5(2) does “not affect rules on jurisdiction related to 
subject matter or to the value of the claim;” and Article 5(3)(b) 
provides that the general rule shall not affect rules “on the internal 
allocation of jurisdiction among the courts of a Contracting 
State.”118  However, Article 5(3)(b) states, “where the chosen court 
has discretion as to whether transfer a case” from one court to 
another within the Contracting State, “due consideration should be 
given to the choice of the parties.”119  As will be explained below, 
these two exceptions complicate analysis of the Convention’s 
impact on the doctrines of forum non conveniens, transfer of venue 
from one federal district court to another, and removal from state 
to federal court.120 
Article 6 of the Convention specifies the obligations of a court 
of a Contracting State other than the court chosen by an exclusive 
choice of court agreement.  That court must suspend or dismiss the 
proceedings to which the agreement applies unless one of five 
narrow exceptions applies.  These include:  that “the agreement is 
null and void under the law of the State of the chosen court,” that 
giving effect to the agreement would be “manifestly contrary to the 
public policy of the State of the court seised,” or that “the chosen 
 
116 See id. ¶126 (discussing the meaning of Article 3(c)).   
117 In contrast, the Convention does provide a public policy exception to the 
general obligation of a court not chosen to decline to hear the case, and to the 
general rule of recognition and enforcement of judgments rendered by the chosen 
court.  Hague Convention, supra note 1, arts. 6(c), 9(e).  See infra notes 122, 131–32 
and accompanying text (discussing this exception). 
118 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(3)(a)–(b). 
119 Id. art. 5(3)(b). 
120 See infra notes 163–75 and accompanying text (examining how these two 
exceptions are involved in the analysis of the Convention’s impact on the 
doctrines of forum non conveniens, transfer of venue, and removal to federal 
court). 
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court has decided not to hear the case” on some basis consistent 
with the Convention.121  This last exception applies, for example, 
when a choice of court agreement refers to a specific court in a 
Contracting State but that court transfers the action to another 
court in the same state based on the internal allocation of 
jurisdiction among the courts of that state.122  In such 
circumstances, Article 6 does not preclude the transferee court, or 
any other court, from hearing the case.123   
3.3. Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments 
The Hague Convention also contains provisions regarding 
recognition and enforcement of certain judgments.124  The general 
rule, stated in Article 8, is that a judgment given by a court in a 
Contracting State designated in an exclusive choice of court 
agreement must be recognized and enforced in other Contracting 
States.125  “Recognition or enforcement may be refused only on the 
grounds specified in [the] Convention.”126  The enforcing court is 
prohibited from reviewing the merits of the judgment, except as 
necessary to determine whether a ground for nonrecognition 
applies, and is bound by the findings of fact on which the court of 
origin based it jurisdiction under the Convention.127  However, a 
 
121 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 6(a), (c), (e).  See also EXPLANATORY 
REPORT, supra note 104, ¶¶141–59, at 46–49 (providing an excellent discussion of 
this general obligation and the five specific exceptions). 
122 See EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 104, ¶¶155–59, at 48–49 (discussing 
this exception and providing examples). 
123 See id. (discussing this exception and providing examples).  This exception 
recognizes that in order to avoid a denial of justice, some court must be available 
to hear the case.  Id. ¶155, at 48. 
124 Hague Convention, supra note 1, arts. 8–12, 22.  “Recognition” means the 
court so requested “gives effect to the determination of the legal rights and 
obligations made by the court of origin.”  EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 104, 
¶170, at 51.  “Enforcement” means the application of the legal procedures of the 
court so requested to ensure that the defendant obeys the court of origin’s 
judgment.  Id. 
125 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 8(1).  In addition, Article 22 permits 
Contracting States, through reciprocal declarations, to extend the recognition and 
enforcement provisions of the Convention to non-exclusive choice of court 
agreements.  See EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 104, ¶¶240–55, at 66–69 
(discussing the provisions of Article 22). 
126 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 8(1).  
127 Id. art. 8(2) (binding the reviewing court to the court of origin’s findings 
on jurisdiction “unless the judgment was given by default”).   
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judgment will be recognized and enforced only if it is in effect and 
enforceable in the “State of origin.”128   
All of the exceptions to recognition and enforcement specified 
in the Convention are discretionary.129  Consequently, even where 
one or more exceptions apply, the Convention does not preclude 
recognition and enforcement.130  The specific exceptions to 
recognition and enforcement stated in Article 9 include:  the 
agreement was “null and void” under the law of the chosen State, 
unless the chosen court has determined that the agreement is valid; 
the defendant did not receive proper notice; the judgment was 
obtained through fraud or is inconsistent with another judgment; 
or where recognition and enforcement would be “manifestly 
incompatible with the public policy of the requested State, 
including situations where the specific proceedings leading to the 
judgment were incompatible with fundamental principles of 
procedural fairness of that State.”131  This last exception is intended 
to be very narrow, referring only to the most basic norms and 
principles of the enforcement state.132   
The Convention’s recognition and enforcement provisions also 
apply to a judgment given by a court in a Contracting State after a 
transfer of the case from the chosen court as permitted by Article 
5(3).133  However, where the chosen court had discretion as to 
whether to transfer the case to another court, recognition and 
enforcement may be refused against a party who objected to the 
transfer in a timely manner in the state of origin.134  For example, 
where the case was commenced by the plaintiff in the chosen 
federal district court but was transferred over plaintiff’s objection 
to another federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), a 
 
128 Id. art. 8(3).  Recognition and enforcement may be postponed or refused if 
the judgment is subject to review in the country of origin.  Id. art. 8(4). 
129 See id. arts. 8(1), 8(5), 9–11 (providing various grounds under which 
recognition and enforcement “may” be refused). 
130 See EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 104, ¶182, at 53 (noting that when an 
exception applies, the Convention does not require recognition and enforcement 
of the judgment, but “does not preclude [the enforcing court] from doing so”).  
131 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 9(a), (c)–(e).  
132 See EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 104, ¶¶151–53, 189–90 (noting that 
the exception is intended to apply to those judgments that would 
“axiomatic[ally]” be contrary to public policy). 
133 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 8(5).  For discussion of the transfer 
provisions of Article 5(3), see supra notes 118–19 and accompanying text.  
134 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 8(5).   
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court in another Contracting State need not recognize a judgment 
against the plaintiff.135 
The Convention’s enforcement provisions clearly apply to 
foreign judgments denying or awarding money damages.136  
However, Article 11 provides that recognition or enforcement of a 
money judgment may be refused if, and to the extent that, the 
damages do not compensate a party for actual loss or harm 
suffered, “including exemplary or punitive damages.”137  
However, the enforcing court must take into account whether and 
to what extent the damages awarded serve to cover costs and 
expenses related to the proceedings.138 
Interestingly, the Convention’s enforcement provisions are not 
expressly limited to foreign judgments for money damages.  This 
means that these provisions may also apply to a non-monetary 
judgment, such as one for specific performance or injunctive 
relief.139  However, a Contracting State is be obliged to enforce a 
non-monetary remedy that is not available under its own law.140 
4. THE IMPACT OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON CHOICE OF COURT 
AGREEMENTS ON COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 
4.1. The Hague Convention Preempts Contrary Domestic Law 
By its terms, the Hague Convention “shall apply in 
international cases to exclusive choice of court agreements 
concluded in civil or commercial matters.”141  The Convention also 
contains similar mandatory language in most of its key provisions.  
 
135 See EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 104, ¶¶175–81 (providing examples 
and discussing various applications of Article 8(5)). 
136 See id. ¶¶ 203–05 (providing a discussion of the structure and purpose of 
Article 11 concerning damages). 
137 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(1).  See EXPLANATORY REPORT, 
supra note 104, ¶¶ 203–05 (identifying the concerns and drafting history that 
underlie the Article’s provisions). 
138 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2).   
139 See EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 104, ¶¶89, 164, n.201 (demonstrating 
together that a Contracting State must recognize an applicable non-monetary 
judgment of another Contracting State to the best of its ability).  
140 See id. ¶89 (explaining that enforcing courts, which are not required to 
grant remedies that are unavailable under their own laws, should apply the 
internal enforcement measures available to them that give the foreign judgment 
the truest effect).   
141 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(1).  
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For example, when delineating the obligations of the contractually 
chosen court and of courts not chosen, the Convention states that 
the court designated in an exclusive agreement “shall have 
jurisdiction to decide a dispute to which the agreement applies,” 
and a court not chosen “shall suspend or dismiss proceedings to 
which an exclusive agreement applies.”142  Likewise, when 
addressing recognition of foreign judgments, the Convention states 
that such judgments “shall be recognized and enforced” unless a 
specified exception applies.143 
The mandatory nature of this treaty means that, by virtue of the 
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, its standards preempt 
inconsistent state and federal law in cases where the Convention 
applies.144  Consequently, in such cases, the Convention’s 
directives regarding enforcement of choice of court agreements 
and recognition of judgments will prevail over contrary rules 
followed by U.S. courts in cases outside the scope of the 
Convention.   
4.2. The Hague Convention and Enforcement of Forum Selection 
Clauses in U.S. Courts 
As discussed previously, the vast majority of courts in the 
United States will enforce a choice of court agreement, unless the 
resisting party shows that enforcement would be unreasonable and 
unjust.145  Enforcement will be denied only when the agreement is 
invalid based on contract formation principles, is contrary to the 
public policy of the forum, or designates a forum that is so gravely 
inconvenient that it will effectively deprive a party of a meaningful 
day in court.146  This standard is essentially the same as the one set 
 
142 Id. arts. 5(1), 6. 
143 Id. art. 8(1). 
144 See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699 
(1988) (indicating that, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, the Hague Service 
Convention preempts inconsistent methods of service of process prescribed by 
state law).  
145 See supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text (discussing the willingness of 
courts in the United States to enforce choice of courts agreements).   
146 See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing reasons why United 
States courts might decide against enforcing choice of court agreements). 
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forth in Article 6 of the Hague Convention.147  However, there are 
some minor differences. 
The Convention does not explicitly provide any exception to 
enforcement based on inconvenience, “grave” or otherwise.148  
However, Article 6 authorizes the court not chosen to exercise 
jurisdiction where giving effect to the choice of court agreement 
would lead to a “manifest injustice.”149  This broad reference would 
seem to encompass those exceptional circumstances where the 
inconveniences associated with the chosen forum are so profound 
that they will effectively deprive a party of a meaningful day in 
court.150  In addition, the Convention does not authorize an 
exception to enforcement of a choice of court agreement where 
doing so would be contrary to the public policy of the state of the 
chosen court.151  Some jurisdictions within the United States do 
recognize these grounds for non-enforcement, although they are 
infrequently invoked.152   
Although nearly every jurisdiction in the United States has 
adopted standards similar to those in the Convention, a few states 
treat forum selection clauses less favorably.153  When these state 
laws conflict with the Hague Convention, the Convention’s 
provisions will prevail.154  The most significant difference between 
the Convention and domestic law does not involve enforcement 
 
147 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 6.  See supra notes 112–17, 121 and 
accompanying text (discussing circumstances under which the Hague Convention 
does not require that a choice of court decision be enforced). 
148 See Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 6 (lacking an explicit 
inconvenience exception).   
149 Id. art. 6(c). 
150 See EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 104, ¶¶151–53, at 48 (discussing the 
“two limbs” of Article 6(c)).   
151 See supra note 117 and accompanying text (noting that although the 
Convention does not allow a chosen court to refuse to enforce a choice of court 
agreement which would be contrary to its public policy, the Convention does 
provide public policy exceptions to the general obligation of the court not chosen 
to decline to hear a case, and to the general rule of recognition and enforcement of 
judgments rendered by the chosen court).   
152 See, e.g., Cerami-Kote, Inc. v. Energywave Corp., 733 P.2d 1143 (Idaho 
1989) (determining the forum selection clause in the contract violated the public 
policy of the State of Florida). 
153 See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text (discussing state laws 
disfavoring forum selection clauses). 
154 See supra note 144 and accompanying text (addressing the preemptive 
effect of the Convention). 
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standards but rather the interpretation of an otherwise enforceable 
agreement. 
The Convention states that a choice of court agreement which 
designates the courts of one Contracting State, or one or more 
specific courts of one contacting state, “shall be deemed to be 
exclusive unless the parties have expressly provided otherwise.”155  
This presumption of exclusivity conflicts with the interpretative 
approach taken by many U.S. courts, which presume against 
exclusivity.156  The Convention preempts this domestic approach in 
cases within the treaty’s scope. 
4.3. The Hague Convention and Forum Non Conveniens 
The Hague Convention has a clear impact on the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens applied in U.S. courts.  As explained above, 
an important general rule of the Hague Convention is that the 
court designated as the exclusive forum in a valid choice of court 
agreement is precluded from dismissing or staying an action based 
on forum non conveniens.157  But this general rule is subject to so 
many exceptions that its impact on the use of forum non 
conveniens by courts in the United States is considerably less than 
first appears. 
The most frequent, and the most controversial, use of forum 
non conveniens is in transnational tort cases—often product 
liability actions—brought by foreign persons in a U.S. court 
seeking recovery of personal injury damages from defendants who 
reside in the United States.158  Such personal injury actions are 
expressly excluded from the scope of the Convention.159  Likewise, 
the Convention specifically excludes other types of cases where 
forum non conveniens motions are likely, including tort actions for 
damage to tangible property that do not arise from contractual 
 
155 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(b).  See also EXPLANATORY REPORT, 
supra note 104, ¶¶ 102–109 (discussing the manner in which the exclusivity of a 
choice of court agreement is interpreted under the Convention and providing 
examples).     
156 See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text (discussing the reluctance of 
some courts in the United States to read choice of court agreements as exclusive). 
157 See supra notes 113–14 and accompanying text (detailing the Hague 
Convention’s limits on forum non conveniens). 
158 See Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Retaliatory Legislation, supra note 16, 
at 609–11, 618–21 (collecting authorities and discussing the frequent use of forum 
non conveniens in transnational tort litigation). 
159 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 2(2)(j). 
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relationships, anti-trust claims, marine pollution claims, and many 
actions involving intellectual property rights (other than copyright 
and related rights).160 
However, with respect to those commercial and civil matters 
that do come within the scope of the Convention, an action 
commenced in a U.S. court pursuant to an exclusive choice of court 
agreement cannot be dismissed or stayed based on forum non 
conveniens if the alternative forum is in another country.161  This is 
certainly a significant change in the availability of the common law 
doctrine.  Whether a forum non conveniens dismissal is permitted 
when the alternative forum is in another state within the United 
States depends on the description of the forum designated in an 
exclusive choice of court agreement.162  The same analysis applies 
to motions to transfer venue from one federal district court to 
another pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1404(a), which is discussed below.   
4.4. The Hague Convention and Federal Court Transfer of Venue 
The Hague Convention recognizes that some signatory 
countries may not have unified legal systems.163  For example, the 
United States is comprised of a number of states with different 
systems of law and, in addition, a separate federal court system 
with limited subject matter jurisdiction.  The Convention addresses 
non-unified legal systems by directing that “any reference to the 
court or courts of a State shall be construed as referring, where 
appropriate, to the court or courts in the relevant territorial 
unit.”164  Consequently, if an exclusive choice of court agreement 
designates “the courts of the State of California,” the word “State” 
in Article 5(2) would refer to California and not to the United 
States, and the California state court would be precluded under 
 
160 Id. art 2(2).  See generally CASAD & RICHMAN, JURISDICTION, supra note 4, § 1-
4 (discussing the various types of cases in which forum non conveniens motions 
are granted). 
161 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(2).  See EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra 
note 104, ¶¶15, 107, 127–140 (discussing “non-unified” legal systems and the 
limitations Article 5 places on a court’s ability to decline jurisdiction).   
162 See infra notes 163–168 and accompanying text (discussing interaction 
between Hague Convention and U.S. state and federal court systems). 
163 See Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 25 (describing application of 
Convention to Contracting States with non-unified legal systems).   
164 Id. art. 25(1)(c). 
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Article 5(2) from declining jurisdiction in favor of a court in 
another U.S. state.165 
However, as discussed previously, pursuant to the exception 
stated in Article 5(3)(b), the general rule of Article 5(2) does “not 
affect rules—on the internal allocation of jurisdiction among the 
courts of a Contracting State.”166  Therefore, if an exclusive 
agreement designates “the Superior Court of San Diego, State of 
California,” that state court would not be precluded from 
transferring the case to another state court within California based 
on notions of convenience or proper venue.167  If the exclusive 
agreement generally designates “a court located within the United 
States” and an action is commenced in a California state court, that 
court would not be precluded from dismissing the action based on 
forum non conveniens where the alternative forum is in another 
state within the United States, such as Illinois or Florida.168 
Likewise, if an exclusive agreement designates “the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of California,” that 
federal court would not be precluded from transferring the case to 
another federal district court located in another state pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).169  In this context, the word “State” in Article 
5(2) is properly construed to refer to the United States, and Article 
5(3)(b) would therefore permit a discretionary transfer of venue to 
another federal district court within the United States, for example, 
to the Southern District of New York or the Western District of 
Texas.  
The only limitation imposed by Article 5(3)(b) on this internal 
allocation of jurisdiction is, where the chosen state has discretion as 
to whether to transfer a case, that “due consideration should be 
given to the choice of the parties.”170  This “due consideration” of 
the parties’ choice of forum is essentially the same vague standard 
 
165 See EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 104, ¶¶128–34 (discussing the 
meaning of the term “state” in the Convention, especially as it relates to countries 
containing several territorial units).   
166 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(3)(b).  See supra text accompanying 
notes 118–19 (parsing Hague Convention Article 5 language on allocation of 
jurisdiction between State’s domestic court systems).  
167 See EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 104, ¶¶139–40 (noting, with 
examples, that the Convention allows for internal allocation rules). 
168 See id. ¶¶ 130–31 (discussing similar examples).   
169 See id. ¶¶ 131, 139–40 (discussing a similar example as well as the 
Convention’s treatment of internal allocation rules).   
170 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(3)(b). 
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endorsed in Stewart Organization v. Ricoh Corp., where the Supreme 
Court ruled that an exclusive choice of court agreement did not 
preclude a federal court transfer of venue based on convenience 
pursuant to section 1404(a).171  Therefore, the Hague Convention 
does not alter the ability of a federal district court to transfer venue 
to a district court in another state pursuant to section 1404(a).172   
4.5. The Hague Convention and Removal Jurisdiction 
The Hague Convention does not appear to preclude a 
defendant from removing a case from state court to federal court 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441.  Although the text of the Convention 
is not clear on this issue, the “internal allocation of jurisdiction” 
and the “transfer” language in Article 5(3)(b) may also refer to 
removal of jurisdiction.173  Moreover, Article 5(3)(a) states that the 
general rule of Article 5(2) does not affect the Contracting State’s 
internal laws “on jurisdiction related to subject matter.”174  
Therefore, if an exclusive choice of court agreement designates “the 
state courts of California,” the Convention would not preclude 
removal of an action from a California Superior Court to the 
appropriate U.S. District Court in California.175  However, as 
discussed previously, although the Convention does not preclude 
 
171 See supra text accompanying notes 39–43 (discussing Stewart Org. v. 
Ricoh, 487 U.S. 22, 28–31 (1988)). 
172 Although not precluded by the Convention, in some circumstances a 
section 1404(a) transfer may affect the obligations under Article 6 of a court not 
chosen in an exclusive choice of court agreement, and the recognition and 
enforcement of a judgment given by the transferee court under Article 8.  See 
Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 6(e) (providing that a court in a Contracting 
State other than the chosen court is not precluded from hearing a case where “the 
chosen court has decided not to hear the case”); id. art. 8(5) (providing that 
recognition or enforcement may be refused against a party who objected to a 
discretionary transfer in a timely manner); EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 104, 
¶¶156–58, 175–81 (discussing the meaning of Articles 6(e) and 8(5)); See also supra 
notes 121–23, 133–35 and accompanying text (discussing those Articles as they 
relate to cases transferred under internal allocation rules). 
173 See EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 104, ¶¶ 135–40, n.176 (discussing the 
meaning of Articles 5(3)(a) and (b)). 
 174 Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(3)(a). 
175 For the same reason, an exclusive choice of court agreement that 
designates a court with limited jurisdiction, such as a United States district court, 
will not preclude dismissal if the chosen court lacks subject matter jurisdiction 
under the relevant internal laws.  See EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 104, at 45, 
¶¶136–39 (discussing the meaning of subject matter jurisdiction in federated 
States such as the United States and application of the Convention to those states). 
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removal, the federal court would enforce the exclusive agreement 
and remand the action back to state court.176 
4.6. The Hague Convention and Recognition of Judgments 
The rules for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments 
contained in the Hague Convention are remarkably similar to 
those set forth in the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments 
Recognition Act of 1962 (UFMJRA) and its 2005 revision, the 
Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act.  
Like the UFMJRA, the Convention embodies the general rule that 
judgments within its scope must be recognized and enforced.177  
For the most part, the authorized grounds for nonrecognition are 
the same in both sources.  However, as discussed below, there are 
a few differences. 
Unlike the UFMJRA, which contains both mandatory and non-
mandatory exceptions to recognition and enforcement, all the 
exceptions authorized by the Convention are discretionary.  The 
UFMJRA mandates nonrecognition if the judgment was rendered 
under a system which does not provide impartial tribunals or 
procedures compatible with fundamental due process, or if the 
foreign court lacked subject matter or personal jurisdiction.178  The 
Convention permits nonrecognition on similar grounds, but does 
not require it.179  Although this difference in the two laws appears 
important, its impact will likely be quite limited.  A court in the 
United States is unlikely to exercise its discretion in favor of 
recognition or enforcement of a judgment rendered by a foreign 
legal system whose courts are not impartial or whose procedures 
violate fundamental notions of due process. 
 
176 See supra text accompanying notes 48–54 (discussing U.S. Courts of 
Appeals’ decisions to enforce such forum selection clauses). 
177 Of course, the provisions in the Hague Convention apply only where 
recognition and enforcement of judgments rendered by one Contracting State is 
sought in another Contracting State, whereas the provisions of the UFMJRA apply 
to a money judgment rendered by any foreign country.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 62–69, 124 (discussing the UFMJRA). 
178 See supra text accompanying notes 70–74 (discussing UFMJRA 
requirements in greater detail). 
179 See supra text accompanying notes 129–30 (noting that nonrecognition 
under the Convention is discretionary). 
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4.6.1. The Public Policy Exception 
There are some differences between the language of the “public 
policy” exception in the Convention and the same exception in the 
UFMJRA.  Under Article 9(e) of the Convention, recognition or 
enforcement may be refused if the foreign judgment would be 
“manifestly incompatible” with the public policy of the 
enforcement state, whereas section 4(b) of the UFMJRA more 
narrowly permits nonrecognition if the “cause of action” on which 
the judgment is based is repugnant to public policy.180 
This difference in the public policy exceptions means that in 
some instances a court in the United States may refuse to enforce a 
foreign judgment under the Convention where it would not have 
had the discretion to do so if the UFMJRA applied.181  In those 
states that narrowly focus on the “cause of action,” the Convention 
will preempt state law and require the enforcing court to focus 
more broadly on whether the judgment itself is repugnant to 
public policy.  However, because the public policy exception in 
both laws is discretionary and very narrow, preemption by the 
Convention may have little impact.  Moreover, this difference does 
not even exist in those states that have adopted the 2005 version of 
the uniform Act, whose public policy exception applies to the 
judgment itself as well as to the cause of action on which that 
judgment is based.182 
The Hague Convention also permits nonrecognition of a 
foreign judgment given by a court other than the chosen court after 
a discretionary transfer within the Contracting State, where 
recognition or enforcement is sought against a party who objected 
to the transfer.183  This exception is not available under the 
UFMJRA.  However, even in those few cases where the terms of 
the Convention’s exception are satisfied, a court in the United 
States is unlikely to exercise its discretion to deny recognition 
unless the transferee court in the foreign country was so seriously 
inconvenient, in comparison to the chosen court, that the transfer 
 
180 See supra notes 84–88 (discussing the UFMJRA’s position on the public 
policy exception); supra text accompanying notes 131–32 (discussing the 
Convention’s public policy exception) and accompanying text.   
181 See id. (discussing generally the UFMJRA’s and Convention’s public policy 
exception).   
182 See supra text accompanying note 93 (discussing the 2005 Act).   
183 See supra text accompanying notes 133–35 (discussing this permitted 
nonrecognition in greater detail). 
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denied the losing (and objecting) party a meaningful day in court.  
When such serious inconvenience exists, a court might then 
exercise its discretion and deny recognition, perhaps because the 
specific proceedings leading to the judgment were also 
fundamentally unfair within the meaning of the Convention.184 
4.6.2. Enforcement of Judgments for Non-Monetary Relief 
An interesting area of apparent conflict involves recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgments for non-monetary relief, 
such as specific performance or an injunction.  Such judgments 
appear to be subject to the Convention’s general rule that foreign 
judgments shall be recognized and enforced unless some specified 
exception applies.185  In contrast, the general approach followed by 
courts in the United States is that non-monetary judgments may be 
enforced as a matter of international comity.186  Under this 
approach, a court may be quite willing to recognize a non-monetary 
judgment for purposes of res judicata and collateral estoppel, but 
the same court may be unwilling to enforce the judgment as its own 
without further consideration of the appropriateness of such 
relief.187 
Whether this potential conflict between treatment of non-
monetary judgments under the treaty and domestic law proves 
significant depends on how courts interpret the Convention.  A 
reasonable interpretation is that the “public policy” exception to 
mandatory enforcement applies because this issue is of 
 
184 See Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 9(e) (providing that recognition 
could be refused in such a situation). 
185 See supra text accompanying notes 139–40 (discussing that because the 
Convention is not expressly limited to monetary judgments, it seems to apply to 
non-monetary judgments as well). 
186 See supra note 100 (listing cases where non-monetary judgments were 
enforced in the United States). 
187 See, e.g., Pilkington Bros. v. AFG Industries Inc., 581 F. Supp. 1039, 1040 
(D. Del. 1984) (refusing to issue a preliminary injunction based solely on a foreign 
interim injunction); Yoder v. Yoder, 330 A.2d 825, 828 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1974) 
(holding that although a Mexican divorce decree was enforceable under comity, it 
was not necessary for the court to adopt the decree as its own).  Cf. Baker v. 
General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 234–36 (1998) (distinguishing between 
recognition of sister-state judgment for injunctive relief for purposes of claim and 
issue preclusion, and direct enforcement of an injunction entered by another 
state). 
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fundamental importance to the enforcement state.188  Another is 
that the Convention’s enforcement provisions are not intended to 
require a Contracting State to enforce a non-monetary remedy if 
this is not possible under its legal system.189  Courts in the United 
States will likely adopt one of these interpretations influenced, 
perhaps, by the uncertainty in domestic law as to whether the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause requires enforcement of a sister-state 
judgment for non-monetary relief.190 
4.6.3. Reciprocity 
Some jurisdictions have added a reciprocity requirement to 
their version of the UFMJRA.191  A court in one of these states will 
not recognize a judgment rendered by a court in a foreign country 
unless that country would recognize a similar judgment of the 
state.192  The Hague Convention establishes reciprocal recognition 
of foreign judgments rendered pursuant to an exclusive choice of 
court agreement, and therefore, may make the reciprocity 
requirement irrelevant in cases where the Convention applies.193  
To the extent that a state still refuses to recognize a foreign 
judgment covered by the Convention because the rendering 
country that gave the judgment will not recognize other judgments 
that are outside the scope of the Convention, the reciprocity 
requirement must yield to the Convention. 
 
188 See Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 9(e) (providing for the public 
policy exception); supra text accompanying notes 131–32 (discussing the public 
policy exception). 
189 See EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 104, at 37, ¶ 89 n.201, (discussing 
history and intent of provisions regarding enforcement of judgments for non-
monetary relief). 
190 See Baker, 522 U.S. at 234–36 (1998) (discussing the enforcement of sister-
state judgments for injunctive relief under the Full Faith and Credit Clause); see 
generally Polly J. Price, Full Faith and Credit and the Equity Conflict, 84 VA. L. REV. 
747 (1998) (examining enforcement of sister-state judgments for equitable relief 
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause). 
191 E.g., FLA. STAT. § 55.605(2)(g) (2009) (providing that a “foreign judgment 
need not be recognized if: The foreign jurisdiction . . . would not give recognition 
to a similar judgment rendered in this state.”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 235, § 
23A, ¶3(7) (West 2009) (“A foreign judgment shall not be recognized if  . . . 
judgments of this state are not recognized in the courts of the foreign state.”); TEX. 
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.005(b)(7) (Vernon 2009) (providing similarly). 
192 See supra text accompanying note 190 (discussing the enforcement of 
sister-state judgments for injunctive relief under the Full Faith and Credit Clause).  
193 See supra text accompanying notes 124–27 (discussing the Convention’s 
requirements of recognition).  
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There is one final observation regarding the impact of the 
Hague Convention on domestic recognition and enforcement laws.  
This Article has treated the UFMJRA or its 2005 revision as setting 
forth the relevant standards with respect to whether a court in the 
United States will enforce a foreign judgment.  However, some 
states have not enacted statutes implementing the UFMJRA and its 
2005 revision, and may not have adopted similar common law 
standards.194  To the extent that a state has recognition and 
enforcement rules that are inconsistent with those contained in the 
Convention, the treaty’s standards will prevail in cases where it 
applies. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Where the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 
applies, its standards will preempt contrary federal and state law.  
Despite this, in most cases, the Convention should have little 
impact on the enforcement of forum selection clauses and on the 
doctrines of forum non conveniens, transfer of venue, removal and 
remand, and recognition of foreign judgments in courts in the 
United States.  However, in some areas, the Convention will 
require significant changes in domestic law. 
One such area involves the important question of whether an 
otherwise enforceable choice of court agreement is exclusive, and 
therefore, covered by the Convention, or nonexclusive, and thus, 
outside the scope of the Convention.  The Convention deems many 
agreements to be exclusive that would be interpreted as 
nonexclusive by many courts when applying domestic law.  Courts 
in the United States must replace such domestic law with the 
Convention’s presumption that an agreement is exclusive unless 
the parties have expressly stated otherwise.  And, of course, to the 
extent that the Convention’s standards conflict with the laws of 
those few states that restrict the enforcement of choice of court 
agreements, the standards of the Convention will prevail. 
Another area involves forum non conveniens.  In some 
circumstances, the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements precludes a court in the United States from declining 
jurisdiction based on the common law doctrine of forum non 
conveniens.  This is a noteworthy achievement.  However, these 
 
194 See supra text accompanying notes 62–65 (providing the number of states 
that have enacted the UFMJRA or its 2005 version). 
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circumstances are limited to exclusive choice of court agreements 
in “international cases” that designate a court in the United States 
in “civil and commercial matters,” within the meaning of the 
Convention.  The Convention excludes from its coverage several 
types of actions in which forum non conveniens is typically, and 
successfully, invoked by defendants.  Consequently, that common 
law doctrine will continue to play an important role in 
transnational litigation in courts in the United States. 
Likewise, the Hague Convention will have little or no impact 
on how the federal courts in the United States treat exclusive 
choice of court agreements in the context of motions to transfer 
venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), or of motions to remand 
after removal from state court to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 
1441 and § 1447.  The Convention does not interfere with such 
internal allocations of jurisdiction within a country with a non-
unified legal system, such as the United States. 
Finally, with respect to recognition and enforcement of money 
judgments rendered by courts in other Contracting States, the 
standards set forth in the Convention are remarkably similar to 
those already in effect in a majority of states.  There are some 
differences, but most are not very significant.  Therefore, the 
Convention’s impact in this area, as in the others discussed above, 
should require few changes in the domestic law. 
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